Plato

It was said that he was born of a virgin, and that his father was a deity. He was worshipped by some as a god after his death, and he changed the course of Western civilization. No, it's not who you think. I am referring to Plato (429-347 b.c.), about whom all sorts of apocryphal stories grew up almost immediately after his death.

• Recall that Plato’s teacher. Socrates, was executed for asking questions and seeking truth/ wisdom.

• In his search for truth and knowledge, Socrates ended up exposing frauds and deceivers and moral relativists.

• Therefore, Philosophy was a (sacred?) vocation for Plato, in the service of truth, goodness, beauty and the ordered State.

Philosophy had a political mission for Socrates/ Plato. The great orator, Gorgias (483–375 BCE)[1], says a man well trained in rhetoric gains "the power of ruling his fellow countrymen" because he can "speak and convince the masses."[2] In fact, Gorgias says, there is no subject on which he could not speak before a popular audience more persuasively than any professional. Is rhetoric really that powerful? This speaks to what Plato thought the mission of philosophy was. It was to distinguish appearance from reality.

· Plato was both a writer and a teacher.

· Opened a school on the outskirts of Athens dedicated to the Socratic search for wisdom.

· Plato's school, then known as The Academy, was the first university in western history and operated from 387 B.C. until A.D. 529, when it was closed by the Roman Emperor Justinian.

· His popular published writings are in the form of dialogues, with Socrates as the principal speaker. This discussion format has become known as Socratic dialogue.

Realm of Being / Realm of Becoming

Plato attempts to reconcile two prominent opposing metaphysics of his day:

Parmenides- reality (Being) must be eternal and unchanging and therefore is distinct from the world of our experience.)\

Heraclitus- reality is indeed that world of our experience and is constantly changing.

Also, Plato borrows heavily from Pythagoras: -We have a priori knowledge of objective, non-physical abstract entities which are constant and unchanging. And these entities structure the world we see around us.

Note: Plato is a metaphysical dualist. He denies the monism of his predecessors. That is, Plato believes that in order to explain reality one must appeal to two radically different sorts of substances, in this case, material (visible) substance and immaterial (invisible) substance.

So reality can be seen as divided into two “realms,” the Realm of Being and Realm of Becoming. Key to understanding Plato’s Metaphysics is his distinction between these two “realms.”

The Realm of Being

Realm of Immaterial Objects (Invisible) This is a level of reality which is timeless and eternal and ultimately regulates the material objects with which we interact on a daily basis.

Key concept: “Forms”

Known as "Ideas" gk=“εἶδος” / "Eidos"

But what sort of a thing is a “form?”

First it should be noted that Forms seem to be precisely the sorts of things that Socrates was looking for when he engaged in dialogues in Athens (e.g. What is it that unites then many instances for Justice as one?) To know the essence of, say, justice, is to know what the nature of justice is, what defines “justice” and distinguishes it from everything that is not justice. It would seem that to know what justice is, is to know the very Form of Justice.

• But what kind of thing exactly is a “Form” for Plato?

• What is it that one knows?

• And how does one come to know it?

For instance, is it a kind of physical object, observable through one or more of the five senses? Is it something subjective, an idea in our minds, knowable via introspection? Is it something conventional, a mere way of speaking and acting that we pick up from other members of our community, but which might change from place to place and time to time?

To the last three questions, Plato would answer with a very firm “No,” “No,” and “No.” Let us begin by considering a somewhat intuitive example of a Form: a triangle.

Actually, let us consider several triangles:

The Many and the One

Consider all these several triangles: small ones, large ones, very large ones. Some are some isosceles, some scalene, some obtuse, and so on. Do these many things have some one thing in common? Are these “many” in any respect “one?”

Is there any sense in which we might say these “many” are all “the same,” all “one?” Well, yes; they are all triangles. That is to say, each is a closed plane figure with exactly three straight sides. This defines the essence, the nature, or the FORM of triangles. (i.e. Triangularity). And it is by virtue of possessing this common Form that they ARE triangles. So “Triangle” names a necessary set of properties, not merely an accidental list of properties, that all triangles share. And these necessary properties are jointly sufficient. This special combination of properties is what all and only triangles have in common, by virtue of the possession of which they ARE triangles.

Now let’s note a couple of things:

Notice that no particular depiction of a triangle is going to be perfect. They will necessarily lack, or at least not perfectly exemplify, features that are part of being a triangle. They are going to have lines that are partially broken, or corners that are not perfectly closed, or lines that are not perfectly straight or merely one point thick, no matter how carefully one draws them. Nevertheless, we recognize them to be triangles, albeit, imperfect triangles.

Notice further that all of particular depictions of triangles are going to have some properties that have nothing to do will being a triangle (like being black or blue, or being equilateral or small). These features are features of some triangles and not of others. They do not enter into the essence of triangle. Nothing about being a triangle requires having these (accidental) features.

So lets take stock of where we are so far.

When we understand triangle form we understand perfect triangle form, this despite the fact that we have only ever seen imperfect triangle representations.
Triangle representations only approximate triangularity to some limited extent; they are triangles “more or less.”
Further all triangle representations (imperfectly) possess certain necessary features (i.e. properties essential to being a triangle).
As well as a whole host of other properties that have nothing to do with being a triangle (i.e. properties accidental to being a triangle).
Understanding Triangle Form requires understanding this difference between essential and accidental properties.
Recognizing individual triangles as triangles requires understanding this difference.

A further note about this triangle form: it does not change.

• But all material things, including material triangle representations, come into existence and go out of existence and change in other ways as well.

• Yet, the essence of triangularity stays the same.

So “Form of Triangle ” does not name a physical object. All physical objects are particular, visible changing material things. Forms, by contrast, have none of these properties.

So Forms are NOT Physical Objects

Thus, Plato concludes two related, but independent things from this:

1. When we grasp the essence or nature of a triangle, what we grasp is not something material or physical. Forms then are NOT physical objects. (Metaphysical claim about Forms)

2. When we grasp the essence or nature of a triangle, what we grasp is NOT something we grasp nor could we grasp through the senses. (Epistemological claim about our knowledge of Forms)

Is Triangle Form a Subjective Construct or Cultural Artifact?

No.

We know many things about triangles -not only their essential features, but also we know things that follow from that essential nature, such as the fact that their interior angles necessarily add up to 180 degrees, that the Pythagorean theorem is true of right triangles, and so forth. These things are true quite apart from our knowledge of them; they were true long before the first geometer drew his first triangle in the sand, and will remain true even if every particular material triangle were erased tomorrow.

What we know about triangles are objective facts, things we have discovered rather than invented. It is not up to us to legislate or construct that the interior angles of a triangle should add up to 180 or that the Pythagorean Theorem should be true. We could not individually or collectively construct these facts away. Long before we discovered these facts, they were true and will remain true long after we're all dead.

What we know when we know the essence of triangularity is:

something universal rather than particular
something immaterial rather than material
something timeless rather than ephemeral
something we know through the intellect rather than the senses

Now if the essence of triangularity is something that exists neither as an object in the material world nor merely as an object in the mind of a human or the collective of humans, then it must have a unique kind of existence all its own, that of an abstract object existing in what Platonists sometimes refer to as “The Realm of Being."

Forms and “Natural Kinds”

But Plato does not restrict himself to geometric forms. There are other Forms in the Realm of Being. What is true of triangles, in this regard, is also true of physical objects such as cats.

Were I to show you two cats:

and ask “Is there something that these two objects have in common?” you would likely say, “Yes, there is.”

But note that, on the face of it at least, you are making an existential claim. You are claiming that “There IS something.” or rather, “There exists some ‘thing’ that they have in common.” And what is that thing? What do the two cats have in common?

Cat Form.

Alternatively, one might ask:

“What is it that all on only cats have in common in virtue of the possession of which they ARE cats?”

Likewise, one might ask:

“What is it that all on only good things have in common in virtue of the possession of which they ARE good?”

The answer to these questions are: “The Form of Cat” and “The Form of the Good” respectively.

· But, these forms are not constructions of human thought. (Platonic Realism is opposed to Nominalism[3])

*Note: you must not imagine that the abstract ideas which we come to understand through reason are somehow “created” by reason. The Pythagorean Theorem was true long before anyone knew it. Just actions are just (embody the Form of Justice) whether anyone understands them to be just or not.

The Forms are:

· like perfect examples or blueprints, definitions of particular realities.

· that which "all and only things of a kind have in common and are what they are in virtue of possessing that.”

Residents of the Realm of Being Include-

Forms of:

Geometry

Abstract “Ideas*” (e.g. Truth, Justice, Goodness, Beauty)

Essences or “Natural Kinds” (Dogs, Trees, etc.)

We can recognize cats as cats only because we know (can recognize) the form of cat. Say I show you three cats:

Then I show you a new object and asked you, “What is it?”

You would be certainly correct to say that you have never seen that before in your life. You indeed have never seen this particular before.[4] But if you recognize it as something you have encountered before; it is only because you mind understands “cat form.”

You would likely recognize it as something you have encountered before. “It’s a cat.” you would say. But you could only come to the correct judgement if you were recognizing something with which you were already familiar, because your mind understands “cat form.” According to Plato, this thing that you recognize is NOT identical to anything you have ever seen before with your eyes. As with triangles, no actual cat is perfectly a cat, embodying cat form perfectly. Individual cats are just cats… more or less. And, as with triangles, any particular cat will have accidental properties that have nothing to do with being a cat. Every cat that you have ever seen has either had green eyes or blue eyes or yellow eyes, etc.. Each has been fat or skinny or fluffy or hairless. But Cat Form has none of these qualities.

*Note: this is part of what Plato means by calling Forms invisible. These are “invisible” meaning you have never seen any of them nor could you. Nor can you “image” them in your mind. They are known to you only via your intellect. This leads Plato to say, “What we think we cannot see and what we see we cannot think.”[5]

Individual cats are cats (and not, say, dogs) because they exhibit “cat form” (and not dog form). Were there no such thing as cat form, there could not be any cats at all. That means that:

The sheer existence of cats is sufficient to assure us that there must be Cat Form.
Cat Form governs or orders the natural, visible world.
Cat Form is ontologically prior to (and therefore more real than) individual cats. Particulars are ontologically dependent on the form in a way similar to the way reflections of dependent upon the objects of which they are a reflections, or shadows are dependent upon the objects that cast them,
If, somehow, we were to get rid of all cats (Perish the thought.) Cat Form would be no more affected than the Pythagorean Theorem would be affected by erasing right triangles.

Thus, forms are the “most real,” most lasting, most permanent aspect of reality. They regulate the world of appearances. Particular instantiations, by contrast, can hardly be said to be “real” at all. Further, the only reason particulars are the particulars that they are is in virtue of embodying the form they do. The very existence of particular things is itself parasitic on (thus less real then) the Forms. The relationship of Forms to their particular instantiations is similar to that between me and my shadow, or me and a photograph of me. I’m more “real” than they because they depend on me in a way that I do NOT depend on them.

Note: Any particular courageous act DEPENDS on there being such a thing as “courage” or “FORM of courage.” Thus, according to Plato, the forms are metaphysically prior to the particulars.

Thus, Ultimate Reality (The Forms) is “reflected in/ shadowed by” the constantly changing (less perfect) world of our experience. Plato refers to this latter level of reality as "The Realm of Becoming" The Forms are themselves arranged into a hierarchy, the arch form being the Form of the Good.

“The Realm of Becoming”

· The Realm of Material Objects (The Visible)

· The Level of reality which we experience through our senses

Residents of the Realm of Becoming Include:

Particular things, (e.g. actual dogs, trees, houses)

Triangle Representations

Particular Good Things

Particular True Statements/ Utterances

Particular Just Acts

Particular Beautiful Objects

All of these endure only for a time and then pass away.

The Many can indeed be One

Socrates, Aristotle, and President Joe Beden, though distinct and separated by time and space, are all men because they all participate in the same one Form of Man. Fido, Rover, and Spot are all dogs because they all participate in the Form of Dog. Paying your phone bill, staying faithful to your spouse, and defending an innocent child are all just actions because they participate in the Form of Justice.

Plato realizes that most humans are never really aware of this realm of Forms and it’s relation to the visible world. Regrettably, according to Plato, they are deceived and take appearance for reality. They believe the things that they see before them to be what is real when in fact it is merely an imperfect reflection of what is REALLY real. To illustrate this point, Plato offers his famous “Allegory of the Cave.”

The Allegory of the Cave

In order to understand Plato's theory, we have to entertain the notion that not everything that is real exists in space and time. Indeed, the whole point of his Theory of Forms is that, if true, it proves that there must be a transcendent immaterial dimension to reality.

This view, though ancient, is also contemporary. For instance see Nobel Laureate mathematical physicist Roger Penrose and the (p)latonic Objectivity of Mathematical Realities.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ujvS2K06dg4

Plato offered an allegory the help illustrate what he thinks is going on here.

The Allegory of the Cave

Is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who puts the copy in place of the real object?[6]

- Plato

[Socrates:] … let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened: --Behold! human beings living in a underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.

[Glaucon:] I see.

And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

[Glaucon:] You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

[Glaucon:] True, how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?

[Glaucon:] Yes, he said.

And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?

…

[Glaucon:] No question, he replied.

To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.

[Glaucon:] That is certain.

In The Allegory of the Cave, Plato likens people untutored in the Theory of Forms to prisoners chained in a cave, unable to turn their heads. All they can see is the wall of the cave. Behind them burns a fire. Between the fire and the prisoners there is a parapet, along which puppeteers can walk. The puppeteers, who are behind the prisoners, hold up puppets that cast shadows on the wall of the cave. The prisoners are unable to see these puppets, the real objects that pass behind them. What the prisoners see and hear are shadows and echoes cast by objects that they do not see.

Such prisoners would mistake appearance for reality. They would think the things they see on the wall (the shadows) were real; they would know nothing of the real causes of the shadows.

So when the prisoners talk, what are they talking about? If an object (a book, let us say) is carried past behind them, and it casts a shadow on the wall, and a prisoner says “I see a book,” what is he talking about? He thinks he is talking about a book, but he is really talking about a shadow. But he uses the word “book.” What does that refer to?

Plato’s answer was:

“And if they could talk to one another, don’t you think they’d suppose that the names they used applied to the things they see passing before them?”

Socrates:] And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision, -what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them, -- will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

[Glaucon:] Far truer.

[Socrates:] And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take and take in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

[Glaucon:] True, he said.

[Socrates:] And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he 's forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.

Plato says that we are like those men sitting in the cave: we think we understand the real world, but because we are trapped in our bodies, we can see only the shadows on the wall. One of his goals is to help us understand the real world better, by finding ways to predict or understand the real world even without being able to see it.

Now, Socrates asks us to imagine what would happen if the freed enlightened prisoner were to return to the cave and tell is former prisoners of his adventures and of the true nature of reality and the distinction between reality and the mere appearances of reality.

And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable) would he not be ridiculous?

Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.[7]

We can come to grasp the true Forms with our minds.

[Socrates:] This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world ….

But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right… and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye fixed. ….

Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good.

The Allegory presents, in brief form, most of Plato's major philosophical assumptions: his belief that the world revealed by our senses is not the real world but only a poor copy of it, and that the real world can only be apprehended intellectually; his idea that knowledge cannot be transferred from teacher to student, but rather that education consists in directing students’ minds toward what is real and important and allowing them to apprehend it for themselves; his faith that the universe ultimately is good; his conviction that enlightened individuals have an obligation to the rest of society, and that a good society must be one in which the truly wise (the Philosopher-King) are the rulers.

For Plato the only and proper response to the Forms (once rightly appreciated) is love. (Philo Sophia) This he expresses well in the Symposium when speaking about the Form of Beauty (which is the only REAL beauty). Indeed the Forms are the ONLY things to be truly loved.

You see, the man who has been thus far guided in matters of Love, who has beheld beautiful things in the right order and correctly, is coming now to the goal of Loving: All of a sudden he will catch sight of something wonderfully beautiful in its nature; that, Socrates, is the reason for all his earlier labors: First, [Beauty] always is, and neither comes to be nor passes away, neither waxes nor wanes. Second, it is not beautiful this way and ugly that way, nor beautiful at one time and ugly at another; nor beautiful in relation to one thing and ugly in relation to another; nor is it beautiful here but ugly there, as it would be if it were beautiful for some people and ugly for others. Nor will the beautiful appear to him in the guise of a face or hands or anything else that belongs to the body. It will not appear to him as one idea or one kind of knowledge. It is not anywhere in another thing, as in an animal, or in earth, or in heaven, or in anything else, but itself by itself with itself. It is always one in form; and all the other beautiful things share in that, in such a way that when those others come to be or pass away, this does not become the least bit smaller or greater nor suffer any change.[8][9]

Full text at:

http://webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/platoscave.html

http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/allegory.html

So did Plato anticipate cinema? Where we in caves an mistake shadows for reality?

Epistemological Ramifications of this Metaphysical View:

Since Forms are not perceived (empirically), they cannot be learned through experience; we never experience forms (sensuously). We have never seen, nor could we ever see a triangle. Yet we do know them and lucky for us we do since the laws of geometry govern the world. (Just try to build a deck on the back of your house without it.) Cat Form determines how cats behave. The knowledge of Cat Form is what allows us to recognize cats when we see them, predict their behavior, etc. This is, after all, what one studies in veterinary school.

So, if we don’t learn the forms through experience how DO we acquire knowledge of the Forms? Plato reasons that we must have acquired the knowledge of the Forms somehow sometime before being born (since it was no time after). Otherwise we would never recognize the truth when we see it.

In the Platonic dialogue The Meno Socrates “teaches” a slave boy geometry by merely asking him questions. This is supposed to illustrate that the boy knew the answers already; he merely needed to be asked the right questions in order to remember. This is the thinking behind the “Socratic Method” teaching.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DEF035uNC2M

Plato’s Doctrine of Reminiscence:

All knowledge of the forms must be gained in some sort of existence before our life on earth begins. Humans attain knowledge of the true forms or essences of the material world.

This knowledge can be accessed after birth with the mental processes of recollection or reminiscence that is stimulated by being reminded.

Plato posited that our minds/ psyches must predate our bodies because this is the only way a human could gain knowledge of certain concepts like perfect equality, etc. which cannot be gained from sensory experience. This is one of his arguments to establish the existence of an immaterial human soul.

The Paradox of Knowledge

Paradox of Knowledge: Either pursuing truth is futile or unnecessary. Either we don’t know what the truth is, and therefore can never recognize it, even when we see it, or we already know it and therefore there is no need to look.

Plato’s Solution: We know it but forgot. The world around us and good teachers serve to jog our memory.

Is Plato’s solution too “spooky?”

“To some, the conception of a previous life with its opportunity for a glimpse of the eternal essences may appear fantastic. Yet to any one who believes that the soul survives the body the view that the soul antecedes the body should not seem unreasonable. In any case, the transcendental theory is only an interpretation of the immediate fact that experience fails to account for all of knowledge. The doctrine of the limitation of empiricism remains, whatever one's view about the origin of abstract ideas may be. We cannot derive our categories -- thinghood, quality, relation, causality, -- from experience, because we use them in understanding experience; we cannot derive our laws of thought -- such as the law of contradiction -- from experience, because they are presupposed in any actual process of thinking; we cannot derive universal principles from experience, because experience is limited to particular cases; finally, we cannot derive any concepts (such as white-square) from experience, because they constitute standards by which the data of experience are measured. The kernel of the Platonic theory is rationalism, namely that there is a non-empirical element in knowledge.” [10]

Therefore:

Plato believes that our Consciousness (Soul/ Mind/ Psyche) predates our bodies and will, in all likelihood, postdate our bodies as well. We (our souls) are immortal- like the forms themselves. The individual is identified with his or her MIND, and NOT his or her body. All real knowledge is a matter of remembering the forms. Truth must be in us, innately. Thus Plato defends the claim that we have “innate ideas.” Indeed, his is perhaps the most robust notion of innate ideas.

Innate Ideas: knowledge and ideas already gained by the time of our birth.

Experience is useful only in so far as it jogs our memory of the forms. But it does not/ cannot give us any real knowledge of Ultimate Reality. (This makes him a Rationalist)

Note: A Rationalist is one who believes that the senses are a poor or unreliable source of knowledge and the true knowledge comes from introspection and there exists innate ideas. (This is contrasted with Empiricists who take exactly the opposite positions to those of the Rationalist.)

Note: Even further, he is a mystic- Real/ Ultimate knowledge is imparted to humans by means of a supernatural extraordinary experience. (Thus he has an affinity with certain religious traditions.)

Knowledge and “True Opinion”

In the Theaetetus Plato suggests the inquiry should be directed at trying "… to find a single formula that applies to the many kinds of knowledge" (148d). Plato presumes that there is a single thing, a common form of knowledge, which should be capable of being defined.

Plato rejected the notion that knowledge is simply “true belief.” A jury may correctly believe that the accused is guilty, but if their belief is based on hearsay, we would say that they have true belief, but not knowledge. "But if true belief and knowledge were the same thing, the best of jurymen could never have a correct belief without knowledge. It now appears that they must be two different things" (Theaetetus 201c). In the Meno, Plato explores further the relation between knowledge and true belief (which is there called "opinion").

However, Plato probably would not have claimed the jury could ever have knowledge in the truest sense. In The Republic, Plato claims that sensible objects and events (like the commission of a crime) are stuck at the level of true opinion for metaphysical reasons. For Plato, the only kind of knowledge fully worthy of the title “Knowledge” would be knowledge which is certain, timeless and necessary. True reality lies if the realm of forms alone and thus true knowledge resides in knowledge of the forms alone. Since the realm of becoming is a shadow-image of the true reality, genuine knowledge in the truest sense of the world of appearances is metaphysically impossible. All that we can ever aspire to would be approximate knowledge.

"When [the soul] inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only (i.e. true opinion) and its edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason."[11]

The “Divided Line”

In the Republic, Book VI, 507C,[12] Plato describes two classes of things, those that can be seen but not thought, and those that can be thought but not seen. In the visible world, shadows, reflections, as well as this things of which they are shadows and reflections (plants, animals, etc.) are illuminated by the sun and “known” to us by sight. But of the invisible world, mathematical equations and proofs, as well as the forms themselves, are illuminated by the Form of the Good and known to us (in the fullest sense of knowledge) by intellect. As there are two metaphysically distinct types on objects, owing to the metaphysical nature of these objects, there are two types on “knowing” each directed to its object. There modes of “knowing” are unequal, the former rising as most to “true opinion” the latter only fully deserving of the title “knowledge.”

	A	B	C	D
509D-510A	Likenesses, images, shadows, imitations, our vision (ὄψις, ὁμοιωθὲν)	The physical things that we see/perceive with our senses (ὁρώμενα, ὁμοιωθὲν)	Opinion, beliefs (δόξα, νοῦν)	Knowledge (γνῶσις, νοούμενα)
511D-E	Conjectures, images, (εἰκασία)	Trust, confidence, belief (πίστις)	Understanding, hypothesis (διανόια)	Intellection, the objects of reason (νόησις, ἰδέαι, ἐπιστήμην)

“This, then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the good which the good begot to stand in a proportion with itself: as the good is in the intelligible region to reason [CD] and the objects of reason [DB], so is this (sc. the sun) in the visible world to vision [AB] and the objects of vision [BC].” [13]

Type of cognition	Type of object
Philosophical understanding	Ideas (Forms), especially the Idea (Form) of the Good
Mathematical reasoning, including theoretical science	Abstract mathematical objects, such as numbers and lines
Beliefs about physical things, including empirical science	Physical objects
Opinions, illusions	"Shadows" and "reflections" of physical objects

So again, we cannot see what we can think, and we cannot think what we see. The fundamental problem with the world of the senses is just that it is grasped by the senses, not by reason. Plato (in places) seems to allow that “true opinion” could become knowledge if it was “tied down” with "an account of the reason why." This later is widely accepted among philosophers as “The Traditional Account of Knowledge.”

The Traditional Account of Knowledge

Knowledge is True, Justified Belief.

• Knowledge =

– True

– Justified

– Belief

• Kn = TJB

From the time of Plato on this view of knowledge as true justified belief became the standard accepted by western philosophers largely up until the 20th century. As a result western epistemology has largely been concerned with the question of what constitutes justification and what is the nature of truth. Interestingly however in the 20th century the traditional account of knowledge has come to be questioned and rejected by many philosophers. For more information on this contemporary development and epistemology see Edmund Gettier’s 1963 article in Analysis, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?"

But ultimate knowledge (for Plato that which is truly worthy of the name knowledge) will always be lodged in the world of the intellect/ reason. There is always room for error in the application of the reason to an empirical issue at hand. Only when the reason/ forms/ logos itself is the object do we have knowledge, do we have something that is worthy of the title knowledge. Knowledge of (this) reality is never changing: gained only through thinking. 2+2 =4 : facts are eternal and necessary.

Knowledge and Education

Education is best served by asking the student questions and allowing the student "see" the truth on one's own (Socratic Method). Real knowledge is conceptual and verbalize-able. That which does not yield words or cannot be expressed in words does not merit the title “knowledge” or wisdom or intelligence.[14]

Philosophical/ Dialectical Project:

The successful conclusion of a philosophical argument will yield the correct definition of the concept under discussion, the intellectual articulation and apprehension of the FORM. (E.g. What it is that all and only courageous acts have in common by virtue of which they ARE courageous acts.)

Ethical Ramifications of this Metaphysical View:

The attainment of knowledge of eternal forms is the only worthwhile activity for humans.

What is most real and lasting and important about reality (of value, worthy of attention and service) is the immaterial realm. The most noble part of ourselves (our intellect-soul) is satisfied by nothing less than the transcendent forms. Further, what is most real and lasting and important about an individual (of value, worthy of attention and service) is the immaterial aspect- the psyche or immortal soul. It is the only thing about you that could possibly survive the death of the physical body.

This sentiment would resonate well with later Christians who taught:

"So we fix our eyes not on what is seen, but on what is unseen, since what is seen is temporary, but what is unseen is eternal." 2 Corinthians 4:18

"Do not store up for yourselves treasures on earth, where moth and rust destroy, and where thieves break in and steal. But store up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where moth and rust do not destroy, and where thieves do not break in and steal. For where your treasure is, there your heart will be also.” Matthew 6:19-21/NIV

“Do not work for food that perishes but for the food that endures for eternal life, which the Son of Man will give you.” John 6:27

One of Plato’s ethical slogans: “It is better to suffer an injustice (which does not jeopardize the welfare of one’s immortal soul) than to do an injustice (which does jeopardize the welfare of one’s immortal soul).”[15] To pursue wealth, physical pleasure, worldly glory for their ephemeral charms is to be metaphysically misguided. The wise man (philosopher) realizes that these are not to be sought to the detriment of one’s soul.

(Some) Psychological Ramifications of this Metaphysical View:

Plato starting point for his divisions of the psych/soul is the different classes he observed in society. He concluded that these natural separations must arise from the psychology of the individuals who make up society. Plato notes what motivates people. The objects of our desires distinguish important differences among these desires.

1) Some desires are directed at things.

2) Others are directed at reputation and honor

3) Others are directed at truth.

These correspond to three distinct part of the soul: (1) the appetitive (2) the spirited/competitive and (3) the rational.

Plato explains this tripartite division by an allegory - a charioteer driving two horses. The charioteer represents the rational part of the soul (3). The black horse represents the appetitive part of the soul (1) and the white horse represents the spirited/competitive part of the soul (2).

Plato’s Tripartite Soul

Parts of the Soul	Appetitive (1)	Spirited (2)	Rational (3)
Chariot Part	Black horse on the Left	White horse on the Right	Charioteer
Loves	Emotion, Pleasure, Money, Comfort, Physical Satisfaction	Honor and Victory	Truth, Wisdom and Analyzing
Desires	Basic Instincts – Hunger, Thirst, Warmth, Sex…etc.	Self-Preservation	Truth
The Virtue	Temperance	Courage	Wisdom
The Vice	Gluttony, Lust and Greed	Anger and Envy	Pride and Sloth
Body Symbol	Belly/Genitals	Heart	Head
Class in od People in Republic	Merchants/Workers (Make things/ produce/ Self-interested)	Auxiliaries/Soldiers (Police and Defend)	Guardians/ The Philosopher King (Govern)
Star Trek Character (TOS)	Bones	Captain Kirk	Spock

Mental Health then was achieved and maintained when reason was in control of the other two motivators. The city-state was well when reason was in control of the other two as well. The city was simply a macrocosm of the individual.

(Some) Psychological Ramifications of this Metaphysical View:

• In Plato’s Republic, people who are dominated by reason will become philosophers and eventually rulers.

• People dominated by spirit will become warriors.

• People dominated by appetite will become merchants or manufacturers or workers or farmers.

• Reason should control the soul of the human individual.

• Rational people should control the republic.

• In The Republic, bright women are given a first-class education and are allowed to ascend to the level of philosopher-kings.

(Some) Aesthetic Ramifications of this Metaphysical View: (Beauty)

When we recognize that something is beautiful, we do so because we recognize that it participates in the eternal form of beauty. Beauty names a transcendent object which does not exist in the world of sense objects, but of which beautiful objects are mere imperfect copies.[16] Further, since whether an object participates in the form of beauty or not is an objective relation with no logically necessary consequences for perception, it follows that judgements about whether an object is beautiful or not are not mere subjective reports, but rather claims about objective states or affairs. They cannot be based solely on sensual appeal and are subject to revision and correction.

Judgements of beauty cannot be based solely on sensual appeal and are subject to revision and correction. Nevertheless, “recognizing” beauty, like recognizing truth seems to be a phenomenological revelation or epiphany, an Intuition- a non-evidentially grounded certainty of an objective truth.

Consider:

All A is B

All B is C

Therefore?

Well… All A is C

… but how do you know? (Logical Intuition)

There is felt similarity between that and the judgement that "X is beautiful." or "X is more beautiful than Y."

…but how do you know?

(Some) Aesthetic Ramifications of this Metaphysical View: (Art)

If art is merely an imitation of nature (as Plato thought it was -Mimetic Theory of Art), then art is an imitation of an imitation. This makes it VERY LOW on the metaphysical ladder. Since art primarily appeals to our senses and not our reason this makes it VERY LOW on the epistemological ladder.[17] Since art directs our attention to the physical qualities of things, and the physical in general, it is ethically dangerous. Since art appeals to our irrational emotions, prompting us, sometimes, to weep at playacting and the like, it is psychologically dangerous.

The wise person regulates the art that he or she allows into his or her life according to the directives of reason. The wise polis (city-state, community) regulates the art that it allows into the lives of its citizenry (censorship of art).

An Ancient Quarrel

“there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of 'the yelping hound howling at her lord,' or of one 'mighty in the vain talk of fools,' and 'the mob of sages circumventing Zeus,' and the 'subtle thinkers who are beggars after all'

… Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her --we are very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth.

If her defense fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after the manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle.[18]

Epilog (This is repetitive. - Skip if you already pretty much understand the foregoing.)

In speaking with one of your classmates earlier today I was trying to make the point that Plato's view of how we come to know forms is very different from what we might call the “common sense” view many hold today. Whereas today we might commonly say we see a cat then we see another, cat then we see another cat, and so on, and then we create the concept of “cat” from our experiences.[19] Plato, by contrast, thinks that model is entirely backwards.

In fact, to see a cat as a cat (as appose to an absolute individual particular, unrelated to any other particular of you have previously experienced) requires that we begin with the concept of cat form. Thus, we cannot derive the cat form/ concept of cat form from our experience. Our experience presupposes it. Note that, if we perceive each individual as an individual then they have no common form. Indeed, they have no determination whatsoever. As individuals they are undifferentiated.

What differentiates one individual and thus what serves to make it intelligible and “thinkable” are those forms (definitive natures) it exhibits. These serve to distinguish it from some and liken it to others. We cannot know the individual particular as a particular, but only as the instantiation of some concept/ form or forms.

So note, if I showed you a cat and then another cat and then another cat and then showed you a fourth cat that you've never seen before and asked what you had what this new particular was, you would be quite correct to respond, “I have no idea; I have never seen that before.” As an individual you have never seen this individual particular before. What you have known before is cat form, so to see is as a cat you would need to understand it as an instantiation of cat form. But how did you know what to see as relevant similarities with previously seen cats (essential properties) and what to discard as irrelevant differences (accidental properties)? You could not know which similarities to see as relevant and which differences to disregard as irrelevant if you did not already possess the notion of cat form. Thus you could never come to see these particulars as you could not come to see these as “the same.”

All this to say that, without knowing what cat form is, you could never see cats as cats. All you would see is a series of unrelated individual particulars. Further these particulars would have no intelligible determinations. They would be undifferentiated being or undifferentiated particular existence. Certainly this is not knowledge, and this would not allow us to navigate the world. The mystery to be solved is “Where did our knowledge of cat form come from?”

Of course, Plato tells his spooky story about innate ideas. This is a story that Aristotle rejects in favor of something he takes to be more common sensible. But as we shall see, he has in my view as hard, if not a harder time explaining how this knowledge of forms arises in our understanding.

[1] W. K. C. Guthrie writes that "Like other Sophists, he was an itinerant that practiced in various cities and giving public exhibitions of his skill at the great pan-Hellenic centers of Olympia and Delphi, and charged fees for his instruction and performances. A special feature of his displays was to ask miscellaneous questions from the audience and give impromptu replies." - W. K. C. Guthrie, The Sophists (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 270.

[3] With respect to these common nouns such as “cat,” “triangle,” for “justice” for that matter, there is a philosophical dispute which is sometimes termed “The Problem of Universals.” The two major positions one might stake out with respect to universals is Realism and Nominalism. Without going into too much detail here, realists claim that universals name real, mind independent, objective abstract realities. Nominalists, by contrast, deny that and claim instead that our common nouns are merely linguistic conveniences which we create to sort through the particular items of our daily experience. But the category of cat, for instance, names only a category we create through our social and linguistic practices. With respect to this debate, Plato is clearly a realist. (For more see Lecture 9a - Goodman on Nominalism)

[4] Imagine if you did experience each particular object, of for that matter, each particular moment, as only the utterly unique moment that it is. The world could not make sense to someone who had such experiences. In his book, The Principles of Psychology, William James defines the concept of 'blooming and buzzing confusion' to describe a baby's experience of the world as pure sensation that comes before any rationality.

[5] I have been attributing this quote to Plato for years, but when revising these notes, I sought to find the citation where precisely he actually says this. I can't find it anywhere. I don't think I made it up myself. I'm not that clever. So, if Plato didn't say it, then someone else said it on his behalf. But I haven't been able to track that down yet. Nevertheless, it does express a key insight at the heart of Platonic metaphysics and epistemology.

I did come across a related quote from 20^th Century philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 – 1951). Wittgenstein in a famous letter to Bertrand Russell, dated 19.8.18, that deals with the meaning of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein declares that:

“The main point is the theory of what can be expressed by propositions – i.e. by language – (and, which comes to the same, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown; which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy. (Letters 71).

These words coincide Wittgenstein’s statement in his introduction to the Tractatus:

“The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.”

[7] This is clearly a reference to Plato’s teacher, Socrates. One is also reminded of the passage from the Gospel of Luke, “For the children of this world are more prudent in dealing with their own generation than the children of light.” Luke 16:8b

[8] Plato, The Symposium, trans. Paul Woodruff and Alexander Nehamas (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. 1989).

[9] I think it worth mentioning that Saint Augustine picks up on this theme when he discusses the difference between that which is to be loved (Things to be enjoyed) and that which is to be used. After his conversion to Christianity, addressing God, Augustine laments:

“Belatedly I loved Thee, O Beauty, so ancient and so new, belatedly I loved Thee. For see, Thou wast within and I was without, and I sought thee out there. Unlovely, I rushed heedlessly among the lovely things Thou hast made. Thou wast with me, but I was not with Thee. These things kept me far from Thee; even though they were not at all unless they were in Thee. (Bk. X, ch. 27)

[10] Introduction to Plato Selections, ed. Raphael Demos (1927) http://www.ditext.com/demos/plato.html

[12] “And the one class of things we say can be seen but not thought, while the ideas can be thought but not seen.” Republic, Book VI, 507b -507C

[16] Again, think of my earlier footnote on Augustine and his distinction between things to be used, and things to be enjoyed (loved).

[17] “The tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other imitators, is thrice removed from the throne of truth.” The Republic Book X

[19] This, as we shall see, is more or less what John Locke believes.